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Wittgenstein’s views on religious language have been 
taken by many of his commentators as a form of non-
cognitivism. According to this view “religious statements 
are regarded as exhortations to lead a certain sort of life, 
or as prescriptions on how to lead one’s life, or as 
expressing certain kinds of sentiments or attitudes, such 
as encouragement to lead a moral life.” (Runzo 1993, 157) 
John Hick recognizes the idea of “language game” that 
belongs to the later philosophy of Wittgenstein as the root 
of this non-cognitive interpretation that was developed by 
D.Z. Philips and others. (Hick 1990, 96) Hick also appeals 
to this non-cognitive character of religious language to 
conclude that Wittgenstein held a non-realistic interpreta-
tion of religion. Hick identifies non-cognitivism about 
religious discourse with a non-realist interpretation of 
religion, defining non-realism as a position that interprets 
“religious language, not as referring to a transcendent 
reality… but as expressing our emotions or our basic moral 
insights and intentions or as referring to our moral and 
spiritual ideals.” (Hick 1990, 7) 
Wittgenstein denies the analogy between religious 
language and other assertive languages such as the 
language of science. He wants to show that the proper 
function of religious language is not assertion about reality, 
but some sort of performance. Religious language is not 
suitable for informing one another about a specific kind of 
reality; it has a passionate tone that is appropriate for 
talking of love and submission. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on 
this important role of religious language leads Phillips and 
others to take him as a non-cognitivist. I will conclude that 
although there are some points that support this interpre-
tation, on the whole, it lacks plausibility. Concerning to the 
non-realistic interpretation of Wittgenstein, I will appeal to 
some of his remarks on God and religion in general, which 
are acceptable only in the context of believing in the real 
God. In addition to these remarks, I will argue that 
believing in a real God is what gives importance and 
vivacity to religious language. So, I think that Hick, Philips 
and others, even if they have some right to take Wittgen-
stein as a non-cognitivist, should not take him as a non-
realist about religion. He doesn’t deny the reality of God 
but only our ability to assert some things of Him within the 
language game of religion. Indeed, we become familiar 
with the reality of God not as a result of playing a religious 
language game, but prior to this, through an existential or 
even a rational awareness. Religious language comes to 
express our love and commitment to a known God in a 
passionate tone of voice and this is possible only after our 
familiarity with Him.  
We will explore this further in two sections on non-
cognitive uses of language and religious realism. 
1. Wittgenstein and Non-cognitive Lan-
guage of Religion 
One of the important bases of the non-cognitivist view is 
the appeal to the practical character of religion. Wittgen-
stein repeatedly emphasizes that religion only wants us to 
do something, but does not justify it, because this is 
impossible for religion. He says: 
Religion says: Do this! – Think like that – but it cannot 
justify this and once it tries to, it becomes repellent; 
because for every reason it offers there is a valid 
counter reason. It is more convincing to say: “Think like 
this! However strangely it may strike you” or “Won’t you 
do this? – However repugnant you find it.”(Wittgenstein 
1980, 29) 
Using the terms of Wittgenstein, we can say that religious 
discourse is a practical language-game and doesn’t refer 
to something beyond it. 
In Islamic literature the importance of practices in 
religion is recognized, and the varieties of commands and 
prohibitions of Islam shows makes this evident.  
But Muslim scholars affirm that religious discourse also 
has some important non-reducible descriptive statements. 
Here, I will not reply to Phillips and others who accept that 
religion apparently contains truth-claim statements but 
reduce them to other performative statements. Rather I 
want to demonstrate that even if religious discourse were 
lacking in assertive statements, we would still be forced to 
interpret some commands as pointing beyond religious 
discourse to make the whole of this discourse possible. 
Indeed we cannot end the problem only by appealing to 
the verbal characteristics of religious discourse.  
According to Muslim scholars commands or prohibitions 
presuppose the authority of their source. So God can 
command us to act in such and such a way but he cannot 
command us to accept his authority, for to do so would be 
circular. Religious commands and prohibitions found in 
religious discourse have accordingly been divided into two 
parts: authoritative (molavi) and guiding (irshadi). They 
treat the many commands of religion to the effect of: 
“Believe in God,” or, “Submit yourself to Me,” as guiding us 
to the judgments of reason. These statements are used to 
refer to claims that have a prior endorsement through 
reason, and if we did not have these reasoned claims, we 
would loose the validity of religious discourse in its entirety. 
Khwajah Nasir al-Tusi (d. 1274) in a famous remark said, 
“The negation of reason’s obligation to accept God’s 
authority would lead to a denial of the whole of religion.” 
(al- Tusi 1986,303). 
In summary, not only does religious discourse actually 
have many assertive statements, but also some of its com-
mands or prohibitions are disguised assertive statements. 
But we can construct a second reason for non-cognitiv-
ism to the effect that religious statements cannot be 
justified. It seems that Wittgenstein wants to say that 
religious beliefs principally cannot be justified, or to use 
Malcolm’s phrase, they are groundless. But this cannot 
prove the non-cognitive character of religious discourse. 
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Indeed, some fideists, such as Kierkegaard, have the 
same belief without denying the cognitive character of 
religious discourse. Unjustifiability by itself does not 
commit us to non-cognitivism, unless it is conjoined to a 
strange thesis to the effect that everything that cannot be 
justified is meaningless. This is the needed premise that is 
needed for non-cognitivism. But in his remark Wittgenstein 
only emphasizes the validity of religion even though we 
have no reason to accept it. Indeed his remark indicates 
that he accepts that we can reason about religious beliefs, 
although whatever reasons we adduce for them will be 
defeated by valid counter reasons. How could this be pos-
sible if there were no truth-claims in religious discourse? If 
Phillips’s non-cognitive interpretation of Wittgenstein were 
correct, no bringing of reasons and counter-reasons would 
be possible.  
The third reason for non-cognitivism is constructed on 
the basis of an analysis of religious belief. Believing in the 
afterlife, for example, is not just assent to the proposition 
that some important event will occur at the end of one’s 
life. This is not religious belief and does not belong to first-
order religious discourse. Religious language expresses 
our commitment to a form of life not predicated on the 
occurrence of some event. Wittgenstein affirms that some-
one who believes in a last judgment does not use expres-
sions like “such and such will happen” to make a predic-
tion, but rather to express a commitment to a “form of life” 
for example one in which people feel constantly admon-
ished by God’s approval or disapproval. Indeed, if he were 
making a prediction, it would not count as a religious 
belief. (Glock 1996,321) 
While I agree with Wittgenstein that religious beliefs 
have a major difference from other scientific or ordinary 
beliefs; they express our commitment to some special form 
of life. But contrary to him, I think that expressing our 
commitment does not rule out the assertion of some fact. 
Indeed considering some fact as glorious may motivate our 
commitment to it. We see many verses in our Noble Book 
that describe the details of the sequences of the events in 
the afterlife to stimulate our motivation to commit us to a 
religious life. If I have no knowledge of this fact, or like Don 
Cupitt deny the reality of it, then how can I commit myself 
to this form of life and why? It may be said that the process 
of committing is not a deliberative reasoned decision; it is 
rather the result of unconsciousness training that we 
obtain from our culture. But my question is not answered, 
because as soon as I come to think that there is no God 
and no afterlife, the motivation for accepting these 
sentences is lost. These sentences are similar to meta-
phors that work only in the context of the claim they make 
about reality. For example, when we say that the lion of 
our country is coming, the force of this metaphor depends 
on our claim that somehow, he really is a lion. As soon as 
we withdraw the claim, the metaphor ceases to work. The 
force of religious belief is not in its verbal form, but in its 
pointing to some important facts that are very essential for 
human kind. Whether or not what is claimed by religion is 
true as realistically interpreted, in order for religious belief 
to have the hold on us that it does, the claim that it 
describes reality must be assumed. If we lose our 
knowledge of God, we cannot really pray and we will have 
many doubts about living a religious life. I think that what 
may be said in this regard is that we cannot know God or 
other religious facts thoroughly, but we do have some 
restricted knowledge of Him and the extent of this 
knowledge determines the vivacity of our commitment to 
religious life. According to a verse of the Qur’an the extent 
of the fear of God directly depends on the extent of our 
knowledge of him: “Verily, those of God’s servants who 
fear Him are only those who know.” (35:28). 
I think that what Wittgenstein means to deny is the 
restriction of the importance of religious belief to mere 
prediction and description without paying attention to its 
commitment function. We can agree with Phillips in taking 
religious discourse as incommensurable with other forms 
of discourse, but deny that the only possibility for this 
incommensurability is to reject any assertive character 
inherent to this language game. It is by virtue of being 
multifunctional that religious discourse constitutes an 
exceptional language game. Things and objects have 
different relations to humanity; so, speaking of them gives 
rise to different connotations, and speaking of a real God 
is able to evoke our feelings and commit us to that reality. 
Religious utterances will not lose their objective character 
because of having another emotional function. We may 
accept that the language of religion or morality is the 
language of commitment or submission, but this by itself 
does not rule out their cognitive reference. We can offer 
another interpretation for the difference between the 
religious language game and the scientific language game. 
Indeed, religious language itself has different parts, but 
even those parts that are descriptive of the glory of God or 
the afterlife have a strange emotional function. In religious 
texts, God not only speak us as emotional persons, but 
also as a rational. The neglect of the role of emotion in the 
religion that is characteristic of the metaphysical literature 
does not allow us to ignore the important role of reason in 
our non-metaphysical literature. We must avoid this 
mistake not by committing another mistake, but by recog-
nition of the importance of emotion, action and knowing in 
the religious form of life. 
2. Wittgenstein and Religious Realism 
There is no doubt that the central idea of the religions is 
believing in a real God, and this is represented in religious 
discourse, but Phillips and others try to interpret that in a 
non-cognitive fashion. Here we only concentrate on one of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about God to show that his view is 
more akin to realism than non-realism. He says: “What do I 
know about God and the purpose of life. I know that this 
world exists. …. The meaning does not lie in it but outside 
it. That life is the world. The meaning of life, i.e. the 
meaning of the world, we can call God”. (Wittgenstein 
1979,73) 
Reading Wittgenstein, I suddenly encountered this 
sentence that reminded me of a couplet by the famous 
Iranian poet Mawlavi, known in the West as Rumi: 
Shaykh of Religion said, “The meaning is Allah.” 
The sea of meanings is the Lord of the worlds. 
All the tiers of earth and heaven 
Are as straws in that flowing sea. 
(Mawlavi, I, 3338-9) 
By the “Shaykh of Religion,” Mawlavi means his teacher, 
Shams, who told him that the only real meaning of every 
thing is God. Shams divided meanings to two types: the 
meaning of words and the meaning of the existence. It is 
evident that God is not the linguistic meaning of the words 
“world” and “life”, but is the existential meaning of the world 
and of our lives. Shams taught that while the forms of 
existence are varied, their meaning is one. 
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Ibn Arabi (d.1240) makes a similar remark: “All the world 
is like a single word that has a meaning, and that meaning 
is God.” (Ibn Arabi 1911, ch.338) 
In the light of the long tradition generated by such 
remarks, we can put Wittgenstein’s point in this way; he 
accepts that not only the religious language game but all 
language games (the world) are pointing to something we 
can call God. We must take his remark in the context of a 
realistic and even mystical tradition, even if we cannot 
regard him as a real mystic, in the sense given through the 
religious traditions of mysticism themselves. So even if we 
accept that Wittgenstein is a non-cognitivist with regard to 
religious language, we must accept that he believed that 
the meaning of the whole of this language and also of 
other languages only is God, and if He is not real, the 
whole of the games become empty.  
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